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In the past few years, the world has witnessed an unprecedented popular backlash against international institutions. This paper presents a framework for analyzing the challenges that unilateral, voter-based attempts by one member state to change or terminate the terms of existing international agreements pose for international cooperation. It argues that the mass politics of international disintegration are shaped by an “accommodation dilemma” encountered by the other member states: not accommodating such unilateral attempts is costly, yet accommodating the revisionist country’s disintegration bid carries large contagion risks. Using original survey data from approximately 1.800 British and 60.000 EU-27 Europeans as well as comparative case studies, the paper shows that this framework can help us better understand the ability of foreign governments’ to intervene in domestic disintegration referendum campaigns, the existence of contagion effects across member states and variation in the responses of the remaining member states to voter-based disintegration bids.