作者
Ruilong Deng, Peng Zhuang, Hao Liang
发表日期
2017/5/6
期刊
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
卷号
8
期号
5
页码范围
2420-2430
出版商
IEEE
简介
Smart grid, as one of the most critical infrastructures, is vulnerable to a wide variety of cyber and/or physical attacks. Recently, a new category of threats to smart grid, named coordinated cyber-physical attacks (CCPAs), are emerging. A key feature of CCPAs is to leverage cyber attacks to mask physical attacks which can cause power outages and potentially trigger cascading failures. In this paper, we investigate CCPAs in smart grid and show that an adversary can carefully synthesize a false data injection attack vector based on phasor measurement unit (PMU) measurements to neutralize the impact of physical attack vector, such that CCPAs could circumvent bad data detection without being detected. Specifically, we present two potential CCPAs, namely replay and optimized CCPAs, respectively, and analyze the adversary's required capability to construct them. Based on the analytical results, countermeasures …
引用总数
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