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The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an extensive and esteemed communication protocol employed to regulate signaling as well as for controlling multimedia communication sessions. Recently, Kumari et al. proposed an improved smart card based authentication scheme for SIP based on Farash’s scheme. Farash claimed that his protocol is resistant against various known attacks. But, we observe some accountable flaws in Farash’s protocol. We point out that Farash’s protocol is prone to key-compromise impersonation attack and is unable to provide pre-verification in the smart card, efficient password change and perfect forward secrecy. To overcome these limitations, in this paper we present an enhanced authentication mechanism based on Kumari et al.’s scheme. We prove that the proposed protocol not only overcomes the issues in Farash’s scheme, but it can also resist against all known attacks. We also provide the security analysis of the proposed scheme with the help of widespread AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) software. At last, comparing with the earlier proposals in terms of security and efficiency, we conclude that the proposed protocol is efficient and more secure.