作者
Ben Niu, Gang Tan
发表日期
2015/10/12
图书
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
页码范围
914-926
简介
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) is an effective approach to mitigating control-flow hijacking attacks. Conventional CFI techniques statically extract a control-flow graph (CFG) from a program and instrument the program to enforce that CFG. The statically generated CFG includes all edges for all possible inputs; however, for a concrete input, the CFG may include many unnecessary edges.
We present Per-Input Control-Flow Integrity (PICFI), which is a new CFI technique that can enforce a CFG computed for each concrete input. PICFI starts executing a program with the empty CFG and lets the program itself lazily add edges to the enforced CFG if such edges are required for the concrete input. The edge addition is performed by PICFI-inserted instrumentation code. To prevent attackers from arbitrarily adding edges, PICFI uses a statically computed all-input CFG to constrain what edges can be added at runtime. To minimize …
引用总数
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