作者
Cunxi Yu, Xiangyu Zhang, Duo Liu, Maciej Ciesielski, Daniel Holcomb
发表日期
2017/10
期刊
IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
卷号
36
期号
10
页码范围
1647-1659
出版商
IEEE
简介
Layout-level gate or routing camouflaging techniques have attracted interest as countermeasures against reverse engineering of combinational logic. In order to minimize area overhead, typically only a subset of gate or routing components are camouflaged, and each camouflaged component layout can implement one of a few different functions or connections. The security of camouflaging relies on the difficulty of learning the overall combinational logic function without knowing the functions implemented by the individual camouflaged components of the circuit. In this paper, we expand our previous work on using incremental SAT solving to reconstruct the logical function of a circuit with camouflaged components. Our algorithm uses the standard attacker model in which an adversary knows only the noncamouflaged component functions, and has the ability to query the circuit to learn the correct output vector for any …
引用总数
20172018201920202021202220232024415191915432
学术搜索中的文章
C Yu, X Zhang, D Liu, M Ciesielski, D Holcomb - IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of …, 2017