作者
Paul Grubbs, Anurag Khandelwal, Marie-Sarah Lacharité, Lloyd Brown, Lucy Li, Rachit Agarwal, Thomas Ristenpart
发表日期
2020
研讨会论文
29th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 20)
页码范围
2451-2468
简介
We present PANCAKE, the first system to protect key-value stores from access pattern leakage attacks with small constant factor bandwidth overhead. PANCAKE uses a new approach, that we call frequency smoothing, to transform plaintext accesses into uniformly distributed encrypted accesses to an encrypted data store. We show that frequency smoothing prevents access pattern leakage attacks by passive persistent adversaries in a new formal security model. We integrate PANCAKE into three key-value stores used in production clusters, and demonstrate its practicality: on standard benchmarks, PANCAKE achieves 229× better throughput than non-recursive Path ORAM—within 3–6× of insecure baselines for these key-value stores.
引用总数
20202021202220232024411202416
学术搜索中的文章
P Grubbs, A Khandelwal, MS Lacharité, L Brown, L Li… - 29th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security …, 2020