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Recently, the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu, or Senkaku, Islands in the East China Sea has flamed up between China and Japan. This conflict deserves further attention because of its potential of being the spark to unleash a Sino-Japanese firefight. However, this was not the first time the two Northeast Asian great power rivals have at least verbally fought over who is the rightful owner to the resource-rich archipelago and surrounding waters. The controversy can be traced from post-World War II, over the 1970s and 1990s, to today. The entire process of this largely verbal fistfight can be best understood through the Copenhagen School’s securitization and de-securitization concepts. Japan, being in the role of the administrator, naturally more often desecuritized the issue in the past than did China, while China mostly strategically securitized the dispute. For the current round of escalation over the dispute, interestingly, Japan acted as initial securitizing actor. This paper aims to contextualize the instances in which the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands has been either securitized or desecuritized by either party. The analysis adds nuances to securitization theory, especially concerning the role of societal uprisings in securitizing a dispute such as the one at hand.