作者
Ronald J Gilson, Robert H Mnookin
发表日期
1989/2/1
期刊
Stanford Law Review
页码范围
567-595
出版商
Stanford University School of Law
简介
The traditional American corporate law firm, long an oasis of organizational stability, in recent years has been the subject of dramatic change. The manner in which firms divide profits, perhaps the most revealing aspect of law firm organization because it displays the balance the firm has selected between risk-sharing and incentives, has changed in a critical way. From a long standing reliance on seniority that em-phasizes risk-sharing, profit division is shifting to a system based on the productivity of individual partners that emphasizes incentives. 1 With what seems to be only a short time lag from the change in how profits are divided, a second pillar of traditional corporate law firm organization is under assault. The" up-or-out system"-the long dominant career pattern by which employee (associate) lawyers are either promoted to partnership or fired-also appears to be changing. From a structure in which there were …
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