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I; 1993, British Prime Minister John Major had to threaten. errant Conservative backbenchers with a suicidal snap elec tion to ensure their support in passing a parliamentary bill ratifying Britain's signature of the 1992 Treaty on European Union (the Maas tricht Treaty). On a regular basis in postwar, prereform Italy, prime min isters fell at the hand of factions within their own party, which meant that the average life span of Italian governments could be measured in months rather than years (see chap. 11 of this volume). These are just two examples of a problem that all party leaders share: party discipline in parliament. In the first case we are dealing with what is supposedly the example of a" cohesive" parliamentary system; in the second, with what was one of the best examples of a parliamentary system that was far from cohesive (eg, as shown by the range of factions in the Italian chamber).

Cohesion and discipline matter in the daily running of parliaments. The maintenance of a cohesive voting bloc inside a legislative body is a crucially important feature of parliamentary life. Without the existence of a readily identifiable bloc of governing politicians, the accountability of the executive to both legislature and voters falls flat. It can be seen, then, as a necessary condition for the existence of responsible party gov ernment (Katz 1987; Castles and Wildenmann 1986). For some, the maintenance of a majority voting bloc is simply the necessary condition for winning the parliamentary game. Majorities rule, and whoever can