作者
Yezekael Hayel, Stojan Trajanovski, Eitan Altman, Huijuan Wang, Piet Van Mieghem
发表日期
2014/12/15
研讨会论文
53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
页码范围
1179-1184
出版商
IEEE
简介
Defining an optimal protection strategy against viruses, spam propagation or any other kind of contamination process is an important feature for designing new networks and architectures. In this work, we consider decentralized optimal protection strategies when a virus is propagating over a network through a Susceptible Infected Susceptible (SIS) epidemic process. We assume that each node in the network can fully protect itself from infection at a constant cost, or the node can use recovery software, once it is infected. We model our system using a game theoretic framework. Based on this model, we find pure and mixed equilibria, and evaluate the performance of the equilibria by finding the Price of Anarchy (PoA) in several network topologies. Finally, we give numerical illustrations of our results.
引用总数
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Y Hayel, S Trajanovski, E Altman, H Wang… - 53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 2014