作者
Dong Hao, Zhihai Rong, Tao Zhou
发表日期
2015/5
期刊
Physical Review E
卷号
91
期号
5
页码范围
052803
出版商
American Physical Society
简介
Repeated game theory has been one of the most prevailing tools for understanding long-running relationships, which are the foundation in building human society. Recent works have revealed a new set of “zero-determinant” (ZD) strategies, which is an important advance in repeated games. A ZD strategy player can exert unilateral control on two players' payoffs. In particular, he can deterministically set the opponent's payoff or enforce an unfair linear relationship between the players' payoffs, thereby always seizing an advantageous share of payoffs. One of the limitations of the original ZD strategy, however, is that it does not capture the notion of robustness when the game is subjected to stochastic errors. In this paper, we propose a general model of ZD strategies for noisy repeated games and find that ZD strategies have high robustness against errors. We further derive the pinning strategy under noise, by which …
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