作者
Yutian Wen, Jinyu Shi, Qi Zhang, Xiaohua Tian, Zhengyong Huang, Hui Yu, Yu Cheng, Xuemin Shen
发表日期
2014/10/17
期刊
IEEE transactions on vehicular technology
卷号
64
期号
9
页码范围
4203-4214
出版商
IEEE
简介
The recent paradigm of mobile crowd sensing (MCS) enables a broad range of mobile applications. A critical challenge for the paradigm is to incentivize phone users to be workers providing sensing services. While some theoretical incentive mechanisms for general-purpose crowdsourcing have been proposed, it is still an open issue as to how to incorporate the theoretical framework into the practical MCS system. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism based on a quality-driven auction (QDA). The mechanism is specifically for the MCS system, where the worker is paid off based on the quality of sensed data instead of working time, as adopted in the literature. We theoretically prove that the mechanism is truthful, individual rational, platform profitable, and social-welfare optimal. Moreover, we incorporate our incentive mechanism into a Wi-Fi fingerprint-based indoor localization system to incentivize the …
引用总数
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学术搜索中的文章
Y Wen, J Shi, Q Zhang, X Tian, Z Huang, H Yu… - IEEE transactions on vehicular technology, 2014