作者
Andrea Ichino, Michele Polo, Enrico Rettore
发表日期
2003/10/1
期刊
European Economic Review
卷号
47
期号
5
页码范围
913-944
出版商
North-Holland
简介
When a firing litigation is taken to court, only the characteristics of the employee's misconduct should be relevant for the judge's decision. Using detailed data from an Italian bank and aggregate macro data, this paper shows that, instead, local labor market conditions influence the court's decision: The same misconduct episode may be considered sufficient for firing in a tight labor market but insufficient otherwise. We reach this conclusion after taking carefully into consideration the non-random selection of firing litigations for trial. Although these results refer to the specific situation considered, they raise more general issues. For macroeconomists they suggest that higher unemployment rates may increase firing costs via the effect on courts’ decision criteria; thus, the real extent of firing rigidities cannot be assessed without considering the role of courts. For labor law scholars, these findings are important because …
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