作者
J Teal, P Kusev
发表日期
2021/11/4
期刊
62nd Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic Society
简介
Behavioural science theorists suggest that people’s judge- ments and decisions are often determined by the use of heuristics (e.g., Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) rather than computational processing (e.g., computing probability and money) as assumed by expected utility theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Accordingly, we propose that people’s preferences are deter- mined by binary comparison on the first contextually available attri- bute. Thus, we argue for first attribute heuristic (FAH) where human decision-makers prefer the option with the higher value on the first contextually available attribute. We explored FAH in an experiment where participants had to choose between a hypothetical safe (high probability of winning a smaller monetary prize) and risky (low probability of winning a larger monetary prize) gambles …
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J Teal, P Kusev - 62nd Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic Society, 2021