Scoring strategic agents I Ball arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.01888, 2019 | 86 | 2019 |
Dynamic information provision: Rewarding the past and guiding the future I Ball Econometrica 91 (4), 1363-1391, 2023 | 38 | 2023 |
Probabilistic verification in mechanism design I Ball, D Kattwinkel Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 389-390, 2019 | 38 | 2019 |
Benefiting from bias: Delegating to encourage information acquisition I Ball, X Gao Journal of Economic Theory 217, 105816, 2024 | 12 | 2024 |
Should the timing of inspections be predictable? I Ball, J Knoepfle Available at SSRN 4419716, 2023 | 10 | 2023 |
Experimental persuasion I Ball, JA Espín-Sánchez Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper, 2021 | 6 | 2021 |
Comment on Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007)" Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions" I Ball, MO Jackson, D Kattwinkel arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.03352, 2022 | 5 | 2022 |
Checking Cheap Talk I Ball, X Gao Faculty of Economics, 2019 | 3 | 2019 |
Optimal Auction Design with Flexible Royalty Payments I Ball, T Pekkarinen arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.19945, 2024 | | 2024 |
Content Filtering with Inattentive Information Consumers I Ball, J Bono, J Grana, N Immorlica, B Lucier, A Slivkins Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 38 (9), 9485-9493, 2024 | | 2024 |
Simple Proofs of the Variational and Multiple Priors Representations I Ball Available at SSRN 4709587, 2024 | | 2024 |
Linking Mechanisms: Limits and Robustness I Ball, D Kattwinkel arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.07363, 2023 | | 2023 |
Corrigendum to “Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information”[J. Econ. Theory 145 (2010) 2241–2259] I Ball, D Kattwinkel Journal of Economic Theory 210, 105666, 2023 | | 2023 |
Bauer's Maximum Principle for Quasiconvex Functions I Ball arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.04893, 2023 | | 2023 |
A Unified Theorem of the Alternative I Ball arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.07471, 2023 | | 2023 |
Essays on Information Economics IS Ball Yale University, 2020 | | 2020 |