Social learning and the design of new experience goods P Feldman, Y Papanastasiou, E Segev Management Science 65 (4), 1502-1519, 2019 | 113 | 2019 |
The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests P Schweinzer, E Segev Public Choice 153, 69-82, 2012 | 107 | 2012 |
Crowdsourcing contests E Segev European Journal of Operational Research 281 (2), 241-255, 2020 | 76 | 2020 |
Defining knowledge in terms of belief: The modal logic perspective JY Halpern, D Samet, E Segev The Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (3), 469-487, 2009 | 70 | 2009 |
The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining A Heifetz, E Segev Games and Economic Behavior 49 (1), 117-134, 2004 | 60 | 2004 |
Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions E Segev, A Sela European Economic Review 70, 371-382, 2014 | 58 | 2014 |
Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts E Segev, A Sela Social Choice and Welfare 43, 893-923, 2014 | 42 | 2014 |
Market design with endogenous preferences A Heifetz, E Segev, E Talley Games and Economic Behavior 58 (1), 121-153, 2007 | 22 | 2007 |
Heterogeneous risk/loss aversion in complete information all-pay auctions ZC Chen, D Ong, E Segev European Economic Review 95, 23-37, 2017 | 18 | 2017 |
Impact of a financial risk-sharing scheme on budget-impact estimations: a game-theoretic approach A Gavious, D Greenberg, A Hammerman, E Segev The European Journal of Health Economics 15, 553-561, 2014 | 17 | 2014 |
Escalation and delay in protracted international conflicts A Heifetz, E Segev Mathematical Social Sciences 49 (1), 17-37, 2005 | 16* | 2005 |
On definability in multimodal logic JY Halpern, D Samet, E Segev The Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (3), 451-468, 2009 | 11* | 2009 |
The important role of time limits when consumers choose their time in service P Feldman, E Segev Management Science, 2022 | 8* | 2022 |
Sequential all-pay auctions with noisy outputs E Segev, A Sela Journal of Mathematical Economics 50, 251-261, 2014 | 7 | 2014 |
Sequential bidding in asymmetric first price auctions G Cohensius, E Segev The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 18 (1), 20160196, 2017 | 5 | 2017 |
Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals R Lavi, E Segev International Journal of Game Theory 43, 791-819, 2014 | 5* | 2014 |
Managed trade with imperfect information G Hochman, E Segev International Economic Review 51 (1), 187-211, 2010 | 5 | 2010 |
A Tullock-contest-based approach for cyber security investments D Iliaev, S Oren, E Segev Annals of Operations Research 320 (1), 61-84, 2023 | 4 | 2023 |
Picking the Right Winner: Why Tie-Breaking in Crowdsourcing Contests Matters. C Haggiag, S Oren, E Segev IJCAI, 307-313, 2022 | 4 | 2022 |
Efficiency of sequential english auctions with dynamic arrivals. O Compte, R Lavi, E Segev EC, 369, 2012 | 3 | 2012 |