| Credal pragmatism J Gao PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 176 (6), 1595-1617, 2019 | 47 | 2019 |
| Rational action without knowledge (and vice versa) J Gao Synthese 194 (6), 1901-1917, 2017 | 24 | 2017 |
| Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory? D Fassio, J Gao Synthese 199 (3), 7031-7059, 2021 | 13 | 2021 |
| Against the iterated knowledge account of high-stakes cases J Gao Episteme 16 (1), 92-107, 2019 | 10 | 2019 |
| Self‐deception and pragmatic encroachment: A dilemma for epistemic rationality J Gao Ratio 34 (1), 20-32, 2021 | 9 | 2021 |
| Credal sensitivism: threshold vs. credence-one J Gao Inquiry 67 (1), 463-484, 2024 | 4 | 2024 |
| Should credence be sensitive to practical factors? A cost–benefit analysis J Gao Mind & Language 38 (5), 1238-1257, 2023 | 4 | 2023 |
| Belief, credence and statistical evidence D Fassio, J Gao Theoria 86 (4), 500-527, 2020 | 4 | 2020 |
| Belief, knowledge and action J Gao The University of Edinburgh, 2016 | 4 | 2016 |
| Advances in experimental epistemology J Gao International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (1), 101-105, 2015 | 3 | 2015 |
| Does contextualism hinge on a methodological dispute? SB Ryan, M Gerken, J Gao The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, 81-93, 2017 | 2 | 2017 |
| Cross-linguistic Studies in Epistemology D Fassio, J Gao Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, Third Edition, 0 | 1 | |
| Varieties of Pragmatic Encroachment J Gao Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, Third Edition, 0 | 1 | |
| Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters J Gao | | 2024 |
| 默认假定, 枢轴承诺与闭合原则 高洁 自然辩证法通讯 42 (5), 17-22, 2020 | | 2020 |
Davide FassioZhejiang University在 zju.edu.cn 的电子邮件经过验证
Davide FassioZhejiang University在 zju.edu.cn 的电子邮件经过验证
Mikkel GerkenLecturer of Philosophy, The University of Edinburgh在 ed.ac.uk 的电子邮件经过验证