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Gabriel Y Weintraub
Gabriel Y Weintraub
Stanford GSB
在 stanford.edu 的电子邮件经过验证 - 首页
标题
引用次数
引用次数
年份
Markov perfect industry dynamics with many firms
GY Weintraub, CL Benkard, B Van Roy
Econometrica 76 (6), 1375-1411, 2008
652*2008
Equilibria of dynamic games with many players: Existence, approximation, and market structure
S Adlakha, R Johari, GY Weintraub
Journal of Economic Theory 156, 269-316, 2015
250*2015
Repeated auctions with budgets in ad exchanges: Approximations and design
SR Balseiro, O Besbes, GY Weintraub
Management Science 61 (4), 864-884, 2015
234*2015
Investment in two-sided markets and the net neutrality debate
P Njoroge, A Ozdaglar, NE Stier-Moses, GY Weintraub
Review of Network Economics 12 (4), 355-402, 2014
1822014
A combinational auction improves school meals in Chile
R Epstein, L Henríquez, J Catalán, GY Weintraub, C Martínez
Interfaces 32 (6), 1-14, 2002
181*2002
Investment and market structure in industries with congestion
R Johari, GY Weintraub, B Van Roy
Operations Research 58 (5), 1303-1317, 2010
122*2010
Computational methods for oblivious equilibrium
GY Weintraub, CL Benkard, B Van Roy
Operations research 58 (4-part-2), 1247-1265, 2010
1152010
Experimental design in two-sided platforms: An analysis of bias
R Johari, H Li, I Liskovich, GY Weintraub
Management Science 68 (10), 7069-7089, 2022
1112022
Appointment policies in service operations: A critical analysis of the economic framework
SV Mondschein, GY Weintraub
Production and Operations Management 12 (2), 266-286, 2003
892003
Combinatorial auctions for procurement: An empirical study of the Chilean school meals auction
M Olivares, GY Weintraub, R Epstein, D Yung
Management Science 58 (8), 1458-1481, 2012
862012
A framework for dynamic oligopoly in concentrated industries
B Ifrach, GY Weintraub
The Review of Economic Studies 84 (3), 1106-1150, 2017
85*2017
An approximate dynamic programming approach to solving dynamic oligopoly models
V Farias, D Saure, GY Weintraub
The RAND Journal of Economics 43 (2), 253-282, 2012
71*2012
Measuring the performance of large-scale combinatorial auctions: A structural estimation approach
SW Kim, M Olivares, GY Weintraub
Management Science 60 (5), 1180-1201, 2014
642014
Oblivious equilibrium for concentrated industries
CL Benkard, P Jeziorski, GY Weintraub
The RAND Journal of Economics 46 (4), 671-708, 2015
522015
The scope of sequential screening with ex-post participation constraints
D Bergemann, F Castro, GY Weintraub
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13018, 2018
512018
The social divide of social distancing: Shelter-in-place behavior in Santiago during the COVID-19 pandemic
A Carranza, M Goic, E Lara, M Olivares, GY Weintraub, J Covarrubia, ...
Management Science 68 (3), 2016-2027, 2022
50*2022
Interference, bias, and variance in two-sided marketplace experimentation: Guidance for platforms
H Li, G Zhao, R Johari, GY Weintraub
Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2022, 182-192, 2022
462022
Industry dynamics: Foundations for models with an infinite number of firms
GY Weintraub, CL Benkard, B Van Roy
Journal of Economic Theory 146 (5), 1965-1994, 2011
462011
Transitional Market Dynamics in Complex Environments
CL Benkard, P Jeziorski, GY Weintraub
Available at SSRN 4712504, 2024
45*2024
Mean field equilibrium: uniqueness, existence, and comparative statics
B Light, GY Weintraub
Operations Research 70 (1), 585-605, 2022
392022
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