| Scientific progress: Knowledge versus understanding F Dellsén Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56, 72-83, 2016 | 139 | 2016 |
| Understanding without justification or belief F Dellsén Ratio 30 (3), 239-254, 2017 | 73 | 2017 |
| Beyond explanation: Understanding as dependency modelling F Dellsén The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2020 | 59 | 2020 |
| Scientific progress: Four accounts F Dellsén Philosophy Compass 13 (11), e12525, 2018 | 59 | 2018 |
| Understanding scientific progress: the noetic account F Dellsén Synthese 199 (3), 11249-11278, 2021 | 31 | 2021 |
| The heuristic conception of inference to the best explanation F Dellsén Philosophical Studies 175 (7), 1745-1766, 2018 | 31 | 2018 |
| The epistemic value of expert autonomy F Dellsén Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2), 344-361, 2020 | 26 | 2020 |
| When expert disagreement supports the consensus F Dellsén Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1), 142-156, 2018 | 26 | 2018 |
| Explanatory rivals and the ultimate argument F Dellsén Theoria 82 (3), 217-237, 2016 | 25 | 2016 |
| Thinking about progress: From science to philosophy F Dellsén, I Lawler, J Norton Noûs 56 (4), 814-840, 2022 | 23 | 2022 |
| Scientific progress, understanding, and knowledge: Reply to Park F Dellsén Journal for General Philosophy of Science 49, 451-459, 2018 | 23 | 2018 |
| Scientific realism in the wild: An empirical study of seven sciences and history and philosophy of science JR Beebe, F Dellsén Philosophy of Science 87 (2), 336-364, 2020 | 18 | 2020 |
| Realism and the absence of rivals F Dellsén Synthese 194 (7), 2427-2446, 2017 | 18 | 2017 |
| Reactionary responses to the bad lot objection F Dellsén Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 61, 32-40, 2017 | 18 | 2017 |
| Disagreement in science: Introduction to the special issue F Dellsén, M Baghramian Synthese 198 (Suppl 25), 6011-6021, 2021 | 14 | 2021 |
| Explanatory consolidation: From ‘best’to ‘good enough’ F Dellsén Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1), 157-177, 2021 | 14 | 2021 |
| Should scientific realists embrace theoretical conservatism? F Dellsén Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 76, 30-38, 2019 | 14 | 2019 |
| Divergent perspectives on expert disagreement: Preliminary evidence from climate science, climate policy, astrophysics, and public opinion JR Beebe, M Baghramian, L Drury, F Dellsén Environmental Communication 13 (1), 35-50, 2019 | 13 | 2019 |
| Rational understanding: Toward a probabilistic epistemology of acceptability F Dellsén Synthese 198 (3), 2475-2494, 2021 | 11 | 2021 |
| Abductively robust inference F Dellsén Analysis 77 (1), 20-29, 2017 | 11 | 2017 |
Insa LawlerAssistant Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Greensboro在 insalawler.com 的电子邮件经过验证
