| Remembering objects J Openshaw Philosophers' Imprint 22 (11), 1–20, 2022 | 17 | 2022 |
| A puzzle about seeing for representationalism J Openshaw, A Weksler Philosophical Studies 177, 2625–2646, 2020 | 7 | 2020 |
| Singular thoughts and de re attitude reports J Openshaw Mind & Language 33 (4), 415-437, 2018 | 6 | 2018 |
| Thinking about many J Openshaw Synthese 199, 2863–2882, 2021 | 5 | 2021 |
| Reference in remembering: Towards a simulationist account J Openshaw, K Michaelian Synthese, 0 | 5* | |
| Self-ascription and the de se J Openshaw Synthese 197 (5), 2039-2050, 2020 | 4 | 2020 |
| (In defence of) preservationism and the previous awareness condition: What is a theory of remembering, anyway? J Openshaw Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1), 290-307, 2023 | 2 | 2023 |
| Does singular thought have an epistemic essence? J Openshaw Inquiry, 1-24, 2022 | 1 | 2022 |
| Singular representation J Openshaw University of Oxford, 2018 | 1 | 2018 |
| Perceiving objects the brain does not represent M Barkasi, J Openshaw Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1-23, 2024 | | 2024 |
| Perceptual capacitism: An argument for disjunctive disunity J Openshaw, A Weksler Philosophical Studies 179 (11), 3325-3348, 2022 | | 2022 |
| Debates Contemporâneos em Filosofia da Memória: Uma Breve Introdução CS dos Santos, A Sant'Anna, K Michaelian, J Openshaw, D Perrin | | |
Assaf WekslerBen Gurion University of the Negev, Open University of Israel; University of Haifa在 openu.ac.il 的电子邮件经过验证
