| A dynamic solution to the problem of logical omniscience JC Bjerring, M Skipper Journal of Philosophical Logic 48, 501-521, 2019 | 45 | 2019 |
| Higher-order evidence: New essays M Skipper, A Steglich-Petersen Oxford University Press, 2019 | 35 | 2019 |
| An instrumentalist account of how to weigh epistemic and practical reasons for belief A Steglich-Petersen, M Skipper Mind 129 (516), 1071-1094, 2020 | 26 | 2020 |
| Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience MS Rasmussen Logic and Logical Philosophy 24 (3), 2015 | 23 | 2015 |
| A Higher-Order Approach to Disagreement MS Rasmussen, A Steglich-Petersen, JC Bjerring Episteme 15 (1), 80-100, 2017 | 20 | 2017 |
| Higher-order defeat and the impossibility of self-misleading M Skipper Higher-order evidence: New essays 189, 2019 | 19 | 2019 |
| Bayesianism for non-ideal agents M Skipper, JC Bjerring Erkenntnis 87 (1), 93-115, 2022 | 16 | 2022 |
| Does rationality demand higher-order certainty? M Skipper Synthese 198 (12), 11561-11585, 2021 | 13 | 2021 |
| Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat M Skipper Erkenntnis, 2018 | 13 | 2018 |
| Hyperintensional semantics: a Fregean approach M Skipper, JC Bjerring Synthese 197 (8), 3535-3558, 2020 | 10 | 2020 |
| Instrumental reasons for belief: Elliptical talk and elusive properties A Steglich-Petersen, M Skipper The ethics of belief and beyond, 109-125, 2020 | 10 | 2020 |
| Group disagreement: a belief aggregation perspective M Skipper, A Steglich-Petersen Synthese 196, 4033-4058, 2019 | 7 | 2019 |
| Higher-order defeat without epistemic dilemmas M Skipper Logos & Episteme 9 (4), 451-465, 2018 | 7 | 2018 |
| Unifying epistemic and practical rationality M Skipper Mind 132 (525), 136-157, 2023 | 5 | 2023 |
| Higher-order evidence and the normativity of logic M Skipper Epistemic Dilemmas, 21-37, 2021 | 5 | 2021 |
| Belief gambles in epistemic decision theory M Skipper Philosophical Studies 178 (2), 407-426, 2021 | 5 | 2021 |
| When conciliation frustrates the epistemic priorities of groups M Skipper, A Steglich-Petersen The epistemology of group disagreement, 68-89, 2020 | 5 | 2020 |
| Explaining the illusion of asymmetric insight A Steglich-Petersen, M Skipper Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10, 769-786, 2019 | 5 | 2019 |
| The Humility Heuristic, or: People Worth Trusting Admit to What They Don’t Know M Skipper Social Epistemology 35 (3), 323-336, 2021 | 4 | 2021 |
| Can Arbitrary Beliefs be Rational? M Skipper Episteme 20 (2), 377-392, 2023 | 2 | 2023 |
Asbjørn Steglich-PetersenProfessor of Philosophy, Aarhus University在 hum.au.dk 的电子邮件经过验证
Asbjørn Steglich-PetersenProfessor of Philosophy, Aarhus University在 hum.au.dk 的电子邮件经过验证
Jens Christian BjerringAssociate professor in philosophy, Aarhus University在 cas.au.dk 的电子邮件经过验证