| The instability of matching with overconfident agents S Pan Games and Economic Behavior 113, 396-415, 2019 | 30 | 2019 |
| Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets R Hakimov, D Kübler, S Pan Quantitative Economics 14 (4), 1447-1490, 2023 | 24 | 2023 |
| Exploding Offers and Unraveling in Two-Sided Matching Markets S Pan International Journal of Game Theory, 2017 | 18 | 2017 |
| Targeted advertising on competing platforms Q Gong, S Pan, H Yang The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 19 (1), 20170126, 2019 | 9* | 2019 |
| Experiments in market design S Pan Handbook of Experimental Game Theory, 399-422, 2020 | 8 | 2020 |
| The instability of matching with overconfident agents: laboratory and field investigations S Pan Available at SSRN 4291709, 2017 | 8 | 2017 |
| Commitment and cheap talk in search deterrence S Pan, X Zhao The RAND Journal of Economics 54 (2), 325-359, 2023 | 5 | 2023 |
| Supplement to ‘Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets’ R Hakimov, D Kübler, S Pan Quantitative Economics Supplemental Material 14, 2023 | 1 | 2023 |
| Optimal Top- n Policy IE Hafalir, S Pan, K Tomoeda Policy (December 26, 2021), 2021 | | 2021 |
| Essays on Matching Theory and Behavioral Market Design S Pan The Ohio State University, 2017 | | 2017 |
| Intergenerational Risk Sharing and Redistribution under Unfunded Pension Systems S Pan | | 2011 |
