| How Are Basic Belief‐Forming Methods Justified? D Enoch, J Schechter Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3), 547-579, 2008 | 135 | 2008 |
| Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure J Schechter Philosophical Studies 163 (2), 429-452, 2013 | 123 | 2013 |
| The reliability challenge and the epistemology of logic J Schechter Philosophical Perspectives 24, 437-464, 2010 | 118 | 2010 |
| Hawthorne's Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief CS Hill, J Schechter Philosophical Issues 17 (1), 102-122, 2007 | 100 | 2007 |
| Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens J Schechter, D Enoch Noûs 40 (4), 687-715, 2006 | 77 | 2006 |
| Luck, Rationality, and Explanation: A Reply to Elga’s “Lucky to Be Rational” J Schechter Unpublished manuscript, 2008 | 68* | 2008 |
| Could Evolution Explain Our Reliability about Logic? J Schechter Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4, 2013 | 56 | 2013 |
| Deductive reasoning J Schechter The Encyclopedia of the Mind, 226-230, 2013 | 55* | 2013 |
| Explanatory challenges in metaethics J Schechter The Routledge handbook of metaethics, 443-458, 2017 | 47 | 2017 |
| No Need for Excuses Against Knowledge-First Epistemology and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion J Schechter Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, 132, 2017 | 33 | 2017 |
| Juxtaposition: A New Way to Combine Logics J Schechter The Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4), 560-606, 2011 | 23 | 2011 |
| Is there a reliability challenge for logic? J Schechter Philosophical Issues 28 (1), 2018 | 21 | 2018 |
| Small Steps and Great Leaps in Thought J Schechter Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking, 152, 2019 | 15* | 2019 |
| Difficult Cases and the Epistemic Justification of Moral Belief J Schechter Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12, 27-50, 2017 | 6 | 2017 |
| Weakly Classical Theories of Identity J Schechter The Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4), 607-644, 2011 | 4 | 2011 |
| Two challenges to the objectivity of logic JB Schechter New York University, Graduate School of Arts and Science, 2006 | 4 | 2006 |
| Five kinds of epistemic arguments against robust moral realism J Schechter The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism, 345-369, 2023 | 3 | 2023 |
| Internalism and entitlement to rules and methods J Schechter, P Graham, N Pedersen Epistemic Entitlement, 254-278, 2020 | 3 | 2020 |
| Aiming at Aptness J Schechter Episteme 16 (4), 438-452, 2019 | 3 | 2019 |
| The Theoretical Significance of the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction J Schechter | 3 | |
David EnochProfessor of the Philosophy of Law, Oxford; Professor of Law and Philosophy, The Hebrew University在 mail.huji.ac.il 的电子邮件经过验证
David EnochProfessor of the Philosophy of Law, Oxford; Professor of Law and Philosophy, The Hebrew University在 mail.huji.ac.il 的电子邮件经过验证