| Self-isolation D Baril-Tremblay, C Marlats, L Ménager Journal of Mathematical Economics 93, 102483, 2021 | 18 | 2021 |
| Strategic observation with exponential bandits C Marlats, L Ménager Journal of Economic Theory 193, 105232, 2021 | 11 | 2021 |
| A folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon C Marlats Economic Theory 58 (3), 485-507, 2015 | 9 | 2015 |
| Perturbed finitely repeated games C Marlats Mathematical Social Sciences 98, 39-46, 2019 | 2 | 2019 |
| A Folk Theorem For Stochastic Games with Finite Horizon. C Marlats Mimeo, Paris School of Economics, Université Paris Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2009 | 2 | 2009 |
| Observation delays in teams and effort cycles S Gordon, C Marlats, L Ménager Games and Economic Behavior 130, 276-298, 2021 | 1 | 2021 |
| Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players C Marlats Economic Theory 71 (1), 1-31, 2021 | 1 | 2021 |
| Effets de réputation dans un problème de hold-up C Marlats Revue économique 62 (3), 557-565, 2011 | 1 | 2011 |
| Préferences psychologiques et nouvelle économie politique A Billot, C Marlats | 1 | 2009 |
| Self-isolation (vol 93, 102483, 2021) D Baril-Tremblay, C Marlats, L Menager JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 101, 2022 | | 2022 |
| Corrigendum to “Self-isolation”[J. Math. Econom. 93 (2021) 102483] D Baril-Tremblay, C Marlats, L Ménager Journal of Mathematical Economics 101, 102705, 2022 | | 2022 |
| Information delays and cycles S Gordon, C Marlats, L Ménager | | 2016 |
| Strategic communication in exponential bandit problems C Marlats, L Ménager | | 2011 |
| Reputation Effects in a Hold-Up Problem C Marlats Revue economique 62 (3), 557-565, 2011 | | 2011 |
| Reputation In Stochastic Games with two Long Lived Players C Marlats | | 2010 |
