Voluntary rewards mediate the evolution of pool punishment for maintaining public goods in large populations T Sasaki, S Uchida, X Chen Scientific Reports 5, 8917, 2015 | 1368 | 2015 |
First carrot, then stick: how the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation X Chen*, T Sasaki*, Å Brännström, U Dieckmann, [*joint first author] Journal of The Royal Society Interface 12 (102), 20140935, 2015 | 187 | 2015 |
The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas T Sasaki, Å Brännström, U Dieckmann, K Sigmund Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (4), 1165-1169, 2012 | 162 | 2012 |
The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion T Sasaki, S Uchida Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 280 (1752), 20122498, 2013 | 153 | 2013 |
Replicator dynamics in public goods games with reward funds T Sasaki, T Unemi Journal of Theoretical Biology 287, 109-114, 2011 | 92 | 2011 |
Evolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement X Chen, T Sasaki, P Matjaz Scientific Reports 5, 17050, 2015 | 81 | 2015 |
Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games T Sasaki, S Uchida Biology Letters 10 (1), 20130903, 2014 | 70 | 2014 |
The evolution of conditional moral assessment in indirect reciprocity T Sasaki, I Okada, Y Nakai Scientific Reports 7, 41870, 2017 | 62 | 2017 |
Probabilistic participation in public goods games T Sasaki, I Okada, T Unemi Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 274 (1625), 2639-2642, 2007 | 62 | 2007 |
Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity S Uchida, T Sasaki Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 56, 175-180, 2013 | 54 | 2013 |
Commitment to Cooperation and Peer Punishment: Its Evolution T Sasaki, I Okada, S Uchida, X Chen Games 6 (4), 574-587, 2015 | 47 | 2015 |
The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation I Okada, H Yamamoto, F Toriumi, T Sasaki PLoS Computational Biology 11 (5), e1004232, 2015 | 45 | 2015 |
A solution for private assessment in indirect reciprocity using solitary observation I Okada, T Sasaki, Y Nakai Journal of Theoretical Biology 455, 7-15, 2018 | 41 | 2018 |
Tolerant indirect reciprocity can boost social welfare through solidarity with unconditional cooperators in private monitoring I Okada, T Sasaki, Y Nakai Scientific Reports 7, 9737, 2017 | 39 | 2017 |
A norm knockout method on indirect reciprocity to reveal indispensable norms H Yamamoto, I Okada, S Uchida, T Sasaki Scientific Reports 7, 44146, 2017 | 35 | 2017 |
The competitive advantage of institutional reward Y Dong, T Sasaki, B Zhang Proceedings of the Royal Society B 286 (1899), 20190001, 2019 | 31 | 2019 |
The Evolution of Reputation-based Cooperation in Regular Networks T Sasaki, H Yamamoto, I Okada, S Uchida Games 8 (1), 8, 2017 | 25 | 2017 |
A theoretical approach to norm ecosystems: Two adaptive architectures of indirect reciprocity show different paths to the evolution of cooperation S Uchida, H Yamamoto, I Okada, T Sasaki Frontiers in Physics 6, 14, 2018 | 24 | 2018 |
Experimental evidence of selective inattention in reputation-based cooperation I Okada, H Yamamoto, Y Sato, S Uchida, T Sasaki Scientific reports 8 (1), 14813, 2018 | 22 | 2018 |
Indirect reciprocity can overcome free-rider problems on costly moral assessment T Sasaki, I Okada, Y Nakai Biology Letters 12, 20160341, 2016 | 22 | 2016 |