Probabilistic verification in mechanism design I Ball, D Kattwinkel Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 389-390, 2019 | 40 | 2019 |
Costless information and costly verification: A case for transparency D Kattwinkel, J Knoepfle Journal of Political Economy 131 (2), 504-548, 2023 | 16 | 2023 |
Allocation with Correlated Information: Too good to be true D Kattwinkel Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 109-110, 2020 | 14 | 2020 |
Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents D Kattwinkel, A Niemeyer, J Preusser, A Winter Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 332-333, 2022 | 5 | 2022 |
Comment on Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007)" Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions" I Ball, MO Jackson, D Kattwinkel arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.03352, 2022 | 5 | 2022 |
Linking Mechanisms: Limits and Robustness I Ball, D Kattwinkel arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.07363, 2023 | 1 | 2023 |
Robust Robustness I Ball, D Kattwinkel arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.16898, 2024 | | 2024 |
Optimal Decision Mechanisms for Committees: Acquitting the Guilty D Kattwinkel, A Winter arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.07293, 2024 | | 2024 |
Corrigendum to “Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information”[J. Econ. Theory 145 (2010) 2241–2259] I Ball, D Kattwinkel Journal of Economic Theory 210, 105666, 2023 | | 2023 |
Comment on Matsushima, Miyazaki, and Yagi (2010)" Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information" I Ball, D Kattwinkel arXiv preprint arXiv:2304.05936, 2023 | | 2023 |
Essays in Microeconomic Theory D Kattwinkel Universitäts-und Landesbibliothek Bonn, 2021 | | 2021 |