| Implicit bias, confabulation, and epistemic innocence E Sullivan-Bissett Consciousness and Cognition 33, 548-560, 2015 | 71 | 2015 |
| Biological function and epistemic normativity E Sullivan-Bissett Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1), 94-110, 2017 | 37 | 2017 |
| Biased by our imaginings E Sullivan‐Bissett Mind & Language 34 (5), 627-647, 2019 | 33 | 2019 |
| Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function? E Sullivan-Bissett Synthese 195 (8), 3453-3476, 2018 | 31 | 2018 |
| Fiction, testimony, belief and history K Stock, E Sullivan-Bissett, H Bradley, P Noordhof Art and belief, 19-41, 2017 | 29 | 2017 |
| The epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions L Bortolotti, E Sullivan‐Bissett Mind & Language 33 (3), 263-279, 2018 | 27 | 2018 |
| Unimpaired abduction to alien abduction: Lessons on delusion formation E Sullivan-Bissett Philosophical Psychology 33 (5), 679-704, 2020 | 19 | 2020 |
| Better no longer to be R McGregor, E Sullivan-Bissett South African Journal of Philosophy= Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir …, 2012 | 19* | 2012 |
| Malfunction defended E Sullivan-Bissett Synthese 194 (7), 2501-2522, 2017 | 18 | 2017 |
| A defence of Owens’ exclusivity objection to beliefs having aims E Sullivan-Bissett, P Noordhof Philosophical Studies 163, 453-457, 2013 | 18 | 2013 |
| Fictional Persuasion, Transparency E Sullivan-Bissett, L Bortolotti Art and Belief 153, 2017 | 16 | 2017 |
| The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of belief E Sullivan-Bissett, P Noordhof Philosophical Studies 177 (5), 1213-1227, 2020 | 15 | 2020 |
| Literary fiction and true beliefs JO Young, E Sullivan-Bissett, H Bradley, P Noordhof Art and belief, 85-99, 2017 | 14 | 2017 |
| The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions P Noordhof, E Sullivan-Bissett Synthese 199 (3), 10277-10309, 2021 | 13 | 2021 |
| Is choice blindness a case of self-ignorance? L Bortolotti, E Sullivan-Bissett Synthese 198 (6), 5437-5454, 2021 | 12 | 2021 |
| Aims and exclusivity E Sullivan‐Bissett European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3), 721-731, 2017 | 11 | 2017 |
| How can false or irrational beliefs be useful? L Bortolotti, E Sullivan-Bissett Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1), 1-3, 2017 | 8 | 2017 |
| Moral and legal implications of the continuity between delusional and non-delusional beliefs E Sullivan-Bissett, L Bortolotti, M Broome, M Mameli Vagueness in psychiatry 191, 2016 | 8 | 2016 |
| What makes a belief delusional? L Bortolotti, E Sullivan-Bissett, R Gunn | 8 | 2016 |
| Another defence of Owen’s exclusivity objection to beliefs having aims E Sullivan-Bissett, P Noordhof Logos & Episteme 8 (1), 147-153, 2017 | 7 | 2017 |
Lisa BortolottiProfessor of Philosophy, University of Birmingham在 bham.ac.uk 的电子邮件经过验证
