| Probabilistic Opinion Pooling with Imprecise Probabilities R Stewart, IO Quintana Journal of Philosophical Logic 47, 17-45, 2017 | 52 | 2017 |
| Persistent disagreement and polarization in a Bayesian setting M Nielsen, RT Stewart The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (1), 51-78, 2021 | 28 | 2021 |
| Support for Geometric Pooling J Baccelli, RT Stewart The Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (1), 298-337, 2020 | 14 | 2020 |
| Learning and Pooling, Pooling and Learning RT Stewart, IO Quintana Erkenntnis, 2017 | 11 | 2017 |
| Identity and the Limits of Fair Assessment RT Stewart Journal of Theoretical Politics 34 (3), 415-442, 2022 | 9 | 2022 |
| Weak pseudo-rationalizability RT Stewart Mathematical Social Sciences 104, 23-28, 2020 | 6 | 2020 |
| Obligation, Permission, and Bayesian Orgulity M Nielsen, RT Stewart Ergo, 2019 | 6 | 2019 |
| Conglomerability, disintegrability and the comparative principle RT Stewart, M Nielsen Analysis 81 (3), 479-488, 2021 | 5 | 2021 |
| Another approach to consensus and maximally informed opinions with increasing evidence RT Stewart, M Nielsen Philosophy of Science 86 (2), 236-254, 2019 | 5 | 2019 |
| An impossibility theorem for base rate tracking and equalized odds R Stewart, B Eva, S Slank, R Stern Analysis, anae039, 2024 | 4 | 2024 |
| On the possibility of testimonial justice RT Stewart, M Nielsen Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4), 732-746, 2020 | 4 | 2020 |
| A Hyper-Relation Characterization of Weak Pseudo-Rationalizability RT Stewart Journal of Mathematical Psychology 99, 2020 | 4 | 2020 |
| Path Independence and a Persistent Paradox of Population Ethics RT Stewart The Journal of Philosophy, 0 | 4 | |
| New possibilities for fair algorithms M Nielsen, R Stewart Philosophy & Technology 37 (4), 116, 2024 | 3 | 2024 |
| Counterexamples to some characterizations of dilation M Nielsen, RT Stewart Erkenntnis 86, 1107-1118, 2021 | 3 | 2021 |
| The ideals program in algorithmic fairness RT Stewart AI & Society, 2024 | 2 | 2024 |
| Distention for Sets of Probabilities RT Stewart, M Nielsen Philosophy of Science, 2021 | 2 | 2021 |
| Unanimous Consensus Against AGM? RT Stewart Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (4), 222-231, 2017 | 1 | 2017 |
| Essays on Aggregation in Deliberation and Inquiry RT Stewart Columbia University, 2017 | 1 | 2017 |
| Consensus does not justify contraction RT Stewart, I Levi Unpublished Manuscript, 2016 | 1 | 2016 |
Michael NielsenPhilosophy, The University of Sydney在 sydney.edu.au 的电子邮件经过验证
