| Reputation in continuous‐time games E Faingold, Y Sannikov Econometrica 79 (3), 773-876, 2011 | 152* | 2011 |
| Uniform topologies on types YC Chen, A Di Tillio, E Faingold, S Xiong Theoretical Economics 5 (3), 445-478, 2010 | 57* | 2010 |
| Building a reputation under frequent decisions E Faingold mimeo, 2005 | 29 | 2005 |
| Characterizing the strategic impact of misspecified beliefs YC Chen, A Di Tillio, E Faingold, S Xiong The Review of Economic Studies 84 (4), 1424-1471, 2017 | 28* | 2017 |
| Reputation and the Flow of Information in Repeated Games E Faingold Econometrica 88 (4), 1697-1723, 2020 | 15* | 2020 |
| Real options and dynamic incentives E Faingold, S Vasama (Working Paper, Yale University), 2014 | 4 | 2014 |
| Statistical Foundations of Common Knowledge E Faingold, O Tamuz working, 2022 | 2 | 2022 |
| Moral hazard in stochastic differential games: Beyond markov equilibrium E Faingold, Y Sannikov Unpublished working paper, 2020 | 2 | 2020 |
| Maintaining a reputation in continuous time E Faingold Yale University, 2013 | 2 | 2013 |
| Reputation phenomena in continuous-time games E Faingold University of Pennsylvania, PhD dissertation, 2006 | | 2006 |
Alfredo Di TillioBocconi University在 unibocconi.it 的电子邮件经过验证
Alfredo Di TillioBocconi University在 unibocconi.it 的电子邮件经过验证
Yi-Chun ChenNational University of Singapore在 nus.edu.sg 的电子邮件经过验证
Omer TamuzCaltech在 caltech.edu 的电子邮件经过验证