Envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets P Milgrom, I Segal Econometrica 70 (2), 583-601, 2002 | 1789 | 2002 |
Dynamic mechanism design: A myersonian approach A Pavan, I Segal, J Toikka Econometrica 82 (2), 601-653, 2014 | 674* | 2014 |
Optimal information disclosure L Rayo, I Segal Journal of political Economy 118 (5), 949-987, 2010 | 620 | 2010 |
Complexity and renegotiation: A foundation for incomplete contracts I Segal The Review of Economic Studies 66 (1), 57-82, 1999 | 609 | 1999 |
Contracting with externalities I Segal The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (2), 337-388, 1999 | 597 | 1999 |
Naked exclusion: comment IR Segal, MD Whinston American Economic Review 91 (1), 296-309, 2000 | 591 | 2000 |
The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices N Nisan, I Segal Journal of Economic Theory 129 (1), 192-224, 2006 | 430* | 2006 |
An efficient dynamic mechanism S Athey, I Segal Econometrica 81 (6), 2463-2485, 2013 | 399 | 2013 |
Exclusive contracts and protection of investments IR Segal, MD Whinston RAND Journal of Economics, 603-633, 2000 | 320 | 2000 |
Introduction to choice theory J Levin, P Milgrom | 319 | 2004 |
Antitrust in innovative industries I Segal, MD Whinston American Economic Review 97 (5), 1703-1730, 2007 | 272 | 2007 |
Optimal pricing mechanisms with unknown demand I Segal American Economic Review 93 (3), 509-529, 2003 | 252 | 2003 |
Clock auctions and radio spectrum reallocation P Milgrom, I Segal Journal of Political Economy 128 (1), 1-31, 2020 | 216* | 2020 |
Robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities I Segal, MD Whinston Econometrica 71 (3), 757-791, 2003 | 203 | 2003 |
Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: Divide and conquer? I Segal Journal of Economic Theory 113 (2), 147-181, 2003 | 202 | 2003 |
What makes them click: Empirical analysis of consumer demand for search advertising P Jeziorski, I Segal American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7 (3), 24-53, 2015 | 186 | 2015 |
Monopoly and soft budget constraint IR Segal The RAND Journal of Economics, 596-609, 1998 | 165 | 1998 |
The Mirrlees approach to mechanism design with renegotiation (with applications to hold‐up and risk sharing) I Segal, MD Whinston Econometrica 70 (1), 1-45, 2002 | 147 | 2002 |
Property rights I Segal, MD Whinston Handbook of organizational Economics 100, 58, 2013 | 142 | 2013 |
Public vs. private enforcement of antitrust law: A survey IR Segal, MD Whinston Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper, 2006 | 107 | 2006 |