The politics of presidential appointments: Political control and bureaucratic performance DE Lewis Princeton University Press, 2010 | 1172 | 2010 |
Presidents and the politics of agency design: Political insulation in the United States government bureaucracy, 1946-1997 DE Lewis Stanford University Press, 2004 | 619 | 2004 |
Expert opinion, agency characteristics, and agency preferences JD Clinton, DE Lewis Political Analysis 16 (1), 3-20, 2008 | 400 | 2008 |
Testing Pendleton's premise: Do political appointees make worse bureaucrats? DE Lewis The Journal of Politics 69 (4), 1073-1088, 2007 | 340 | 2007 |
Does performance budgeting work? An examination of the office of management and budget’s PART scores JB Gilmour, DE Lewis Public Administration Review 66 (5), 742-752, 2006 | 338 | 2006 |
Separated powers in the United States: The ideology of agencies, presidents, and congress JD Clinton, A Bertelli, CR Grose, DE Lewis, DC Nixon American Journal of Political Science 56 (2), 341-354, 2012 | 314 | 2012 |
The politics of agency termination: Confronting the myth of agency immortality DE Lewis The Journal of Politics 64 (1), 89-107, 2002 | 288 | 2002 |
Toward a broader understanding of presidential power: A reevaluation of the two presidencies thesis B Canes-Wrone, WG Howell, DE Lewis The Journal of Politics 70 (1), 1-16, 2008 | 263 | 2008 |
Not-so independent agencies: Party polarization and the limits of institutional design N Devins, DE Lewis BUL rev. 88, 459, 2008 | 239 | 2008 |
Agencies by presidential design WG Howell, DE Lewis The Journal of Politics 64 (4), 1095-1114, 2002 | 234 | 2002 |
Political appointments, civil service systems, and bureaucratic competence: Organizational balancing and executive branch revenue forecasts in the American states GA Krause, DE Lewis, JW Douglas American Journal of Political Science 50 (3), 770-787, 2006 | 217 | 2006 |
Assessing performance budgeting at OMB: The influence of politics, performance, and program size JB Gilmour, DE Lewis Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16 (2), 169-186, 2006 | 217 | 2006 |
The consequences of presidential patronage for federal agency performance N Gallo, DE Lewis Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 22 (2), 219-243, 2012 | 205 | 2012 |
Political appointees and the competence of federal program management JB Gilmour, DE Lewis American Politics Research 34 (1), 22-50, 2006 | 180 | 2006 |
Presidents and patronage GE Hollibaugh Jr, G Horton, DE Lewis American Journal of Political Science 58 (4), 1024-1042, 2014 | 170 | 2014 |
Revisiting the administrative presidency: Policy, patronage, and agency competence DE Lewis Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 (1), 60-73, 2009 | 159 | 2009 |
Presidential appointments and personnel DE Lewis Annual Review of Political Science 14 (1), 47-66, 2011 | 152 | 2011 |
Political learning from rare events: Poisson inference, fiscal constraints, and the lifetime of bureaus DP Carpenter, DE Lewis Political Analysis 12 (3), 201-232, 2004 | 144 | 2004 |
Influencing the bureaucracy: The irony of congressional oversight JD Clinton, DE Lewis, JL Selin American Journal of Political Science 58 (2), 387-401, 2014 | 139 | 2014 |
The adverse consequences of the politics of agency design for presidential management in the United States: The relative durability of insulated agencies DE Lewis British Journal of Political Science 34 (3), 377-404, 2004 | 114 | 2004 |