The complexity of modern networks calls for decentralized control schemes where each user
makes its control decisions independently based on some individual performance …

Incorporating pricing information in routing sys-tems has been explored in various contexts
and fashions. In this paper we examine certain fundamental properties important in the …

Traditional computer networks were typically designed with system-wide optimization in
mind. In noncooperative networks users make control decisions that optimize their individual …

The optimal flow control of noncooperative users in multiservice networks is investigated in a
game-theoretic way. We adopt a model that differs from previously considered ones in that a …

We study pricing games in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and
route their traffic selfishly and strategically. Each node (1) makes a bid to each of its …

We model the interaction between the network and the network users as a noncooperative
game and study the Nash equilibrium points (NEP) of the game. We show that there is a …

A noncooperative network is considered, in which each user routes its flow in a way that
optimizes its individual performance objective. Nash equilibria characterize the operating …

We model the multi-path multi-hop routing in networks with selfish nodes as an auction and
provide a novel solution from the game-theoretical perspective. We design a mechanism …

In this chapter, we study two types of pricing mechanisms: one where the goal of the pricing
scheme is to achieve some socially beneficial objective for the network and the other where …

We study a class of noncooperative networks where N users send tra c to a destination node
over two links with given capacities in such a way that a Nash equilibrium is achieved …