We consider a mechanism design problem for the joint flow control and multipath routing in
informationally decentralized networks with strategic agents. Based on a surrogate …

We consider a network where strategic agents, who are contesting for allocation of
resources, are divided into fixed groups. The network control protocol is such that within …

Mechanism design for fully strategic agents commonly assumes that messages are
broadcasted between agents of the system. Moreover, for mechanism design, the stability of …

We consider a noncooperative game framework for combined routing and flow control in a
network of parallel links, where the number of users (players) is arbitrarily large. The utility …

Uninfluenced social systems often exhibit suboptimal performance; specially designed taxes
can influence agent choices and thereby bring aggregate social behavior closer to optimal …

In the standard mechanism design framework, agents' messages are gathered at a central
point and allocation/tax functions are calculated in a centralized manner, ie, as functions of …

We consider a repeated routing game over a finite horizon with partial control under selfish
response, in which a central authority can control a fraction of the flow and seeks to improve …

Mechanism design for fully strategic agents typically assumes that agents broadcast their
messages to a central authority that performs allocation and taxes/subsidizes agents. In …

We consider a multiagent resource allocation problem where individual users intend to route
traffic by requesting the help of entities across a network, and a cost is incurred at each …

How can a system designer exploit system-level knowledge to derive incentives to optimally
influence social behavior? The literature on network routing contains many results studying …