We consider a hierarchical network game with multiple links, a single service provider, and a
large number of users with multiple classes, where different classes of users enter the …

This paper builds on the model and results of T. Basar and R. Srikant,(2002) and extends
them to the case of differentiated prices, again for the single link case. It introduces a …

We consider routing games where the performance of each user is dictated by the worst
(bottleneck) element it employs. We are given a network, finitely many (selfish) users, each …

We introduce the concept of nonlinear pricing within the context of our previous Stackelberg
network game model and view the Internet Service Provider's (ISP's) policy as an incentive …

In this chapter, we study two types of pricing mechanisms: one where the goal of the pricing
scheme is to achieve some socially beneficial objective for the network and the other where …

We consider network congestion games in which a finite number of non-cooperative users
select paths. The aim is to mitigate the inefficiency caused by the selfish users by introducing …

We study the design of price mechanisms for communication network problems in which a
user's utility depends on the amount of flow she sends through the network, and the …

An open problem is presented regarding the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium
(PNE) in network congestion games with a finite number of non-identical players, in which …

We explore the properties of a congestion game where users of a congested resource
anticipate the effect of their actions on the price of the resource. When users are sharing a …

In this paper, we present a combined study of price competition and traffic control in a
congested network. We study a model in which service providers own the routes in a …