Unlike standard congestion games, weighted congestion games and congestion games with player-specific delay functions do not necessarily possess pure Nash equilibria. It is known …
T Başar, R Srikant - Journal of optimization theory and applications, 2002 - Springer
We consider a hierarchical network game with multiple links, a single service provider, and a large number of users with multiple classes, where different classes of users enter the …
We consider algorithmic questions concerning the existence, tractability, and quality of Nash equilibria, in atomic congestion games among users participating in selfish coalitions. We …
A Tang, X Wei, SH Low… - IEEE/ACM Transactions on …, 2009 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
When heterogeneous congestion control protocols that react to different pricing signals share the same network, the current theory based on utility maximization fails to predict the …
Multiple classes of traffic with differing and often conflicting requirements arise in an integrated telecommunications environment as users share the limited existing resources. In …
S Athuraliya, SH Low - submitted for publication, 2000 - Citeseer
A duality model of ow control is proposed in Part I of this paper and leads to a basic ow control algorithm. In this sequel we develop a practical implementation of the basic …
D Fotakis - Theory of Computing Systems, 2010 - Springer
We investigate the effect of linear independence in the strategies of congestion games on the convergence time of best improvement sequences and on the pure Price of Anarchy. In …
We consider a mechanism design problem for the joint flow control and multipath routing in informationally decentralized networks with strategic agents. Based on a surrogate …
A Ganesh, K Laevens, R Steinberg - Operations Research, 2007 - pubsonline.informs.org
We consider congestion pricing as a mechanism for sharing bandwidth in communication networks, and model the interaction among the users as a game. We propose a …