In practice, Internet of Things (IoT) applications may face two different hostile attacks, i.e., overhearing the broadcasted data and detecting the presence of data communication. Previous works have assumed that only one of these attacks is present in the network and have addressed these attacks separately. In this article, we investigate the security of a simple but practical IoT-based point-to-point communication which is facing with the above-mentioned two attacks under some realistic assumptions. In other words, we aim to protect the data against two adversary nodes, namely Eve (who tries to capture the broadcasted data) and warden Willie (who tries to detect the presence of data communication between legitimate nodes). To tackle these attacks, we jointly employ the information-theoretic security and covert communication techniques. To hide information from Willies, we force the source to transmit its message in the selected time slot and the multiple-antennas cooperative jammer to inject jamming during all time slots contentiously which leads to deceive Eves and Willies jointly. To enhance the performance of this security design, we formulate an optimization problem, with the goal of maximizing the secrecy rate subject to power constraints at the source and jammer, while satisfying a covert communication requirement. Since the mentioned optimization problem is nonconvex, we propose an algorithm to solve it. Then, to obtain further insights, we extend our proposed system model to noncolluding and colluding Willies. Next, we study a practical communication scenario, where the source has uncertainty about Willie’s location and knows the channel state information (CSI) of Eves imperfectly. Our numerical results highlight that a more accurate estimation of Willie’s location has a more positive efficacy on the secrecy performance compared to the case with more accuracy of Eves’ CSI estimation.