Interfirm rivalry in a repeated game: an empirical test of tacit collusion
ME Slade - The Journal of Industrial Economics, 1987 - JSTOR
Rivalry in the Vancouver retail gasoline market is modeled as a repeated game. Service-
station demand, cost, and reaction functions are estimated from daily data on individual …
station demand, cost, and reaction functions are estimated from daily data on individual …
Interfirm Rivalry in a Repeated Game: An Empirical Test of Tacit Collusion
M Slade - Journal of Industrial Economics, 1987 - econpapers.repec.org
Rivalry in the Vancouver retail gasoline market is modeled as a repeated game. Service-
station demand, cost, and intertemporal reaction functions are estimated from daily data on …
station demand, cost, and intertemporal reaction functions are estimated from daily data on …
INTERFIRM RIVALRY IN A REPEATED GAME: AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF TACIT COLLUSION.
ME Slade - Journal of Industrial Economics, 1987 - search.ebscohost.com
Rivalry in the Vancouver retail gasoline market is modeled as a repeated game. Service-
station demand, cost, and reaction functions arc estimated from daily data on individual …
station demand, cost, and reaction functions arc estimated from daily data on individual …
Interfirm Rivalry in a Repeated Game: An Empirical Test of Tacit Collusion
ME Slade - Journal of Industrial Economics, 1987 - ideas.repec.org
Rivalry in the Vancouver retail gasoline market is modeled as a repeated game. Service-
station demand, cost, and intertemporal reaction functions are estimated from daily data on …
station demand, cost, and intertemporal reaction functions are estimated from daily data on …