Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment

V Anderhub, S Gächter, M Königstein - Experimental Economics, 2002 - Springer
We study behavior within a simple principal-agent experiment. Our design allows for a large
class of linear contracts. Principals can offer any feasible combination of (negative) fixed …
被引用次数：196 相关文章
[PDF] uzh.ch

[PDF][PDF] Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal0Agent Experiment

V Anderhub, S Gächter, M Königstein - 2000 - econ.uzh.ch
A crucial aspect of an agency relationship is that the agent does not necessarily take actions
that are in the best interest of the principal. This problem is partic0 ularly severe if the …

Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment

V Anderhub, S Gächter, M Königstein - Institute for Empirical …, 2001 - papers.ssrn.com
We study behavior within a simple principal-agent experiment. Our design allows for a large
class of linear contracts. Principals can offer any feasible combination of (negative) fixed …

Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment

V Anderhub, S Gächter, M Königstein - Experimental Economics, 2002 - infona.pl
We study behavior within a simple principal-agent experiment. Our design allows for a large
class of linear contracts. Principals can offer any feasible combination of (negative) fixed …
[PDF] ethz.ch

[PDF][PDF] Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment

V Anderhub, S Gächter… - … paper/Institute for …, 2000 - research-collection.ethz.ch
We study behavior within a simple principal-agent experiment. Our design allows for a large
class of linear contracts. Principals can offer any feasible combination of (negative) fixed …

Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent Experiment

V Anderhub, S Gachter… - Experimental Economics, 2002 - search.proquest.com
We study behavior within a simple principal-agent experiment. Our design allows for a large
class of linear contracts. Principals can offer any feasible combination of (negative) fixed …

[引用][C] Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal–agent experiment

V Anderhub, S Gächter, M Königstein - Experimental Economics, 2002 - cir.nii.ac.jp
Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal–agent experiment | CiNii Research
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[PDF][PDF] Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment

V Anderhub, S Gächter, M Königstein - scholar.archive.org
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[PDF] academia.edu

[PDF][PDF] Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal0Agent Experiment

V Anderhub, S Gächter, M Königstein - 2000 - academia.edu
A crucial aspect of an agency relationship is that the agent does not necessarily take actions
that are in the best interest of the principal. This problem is partic0 ularly severe if the …

Efficient Contracting and Fair Sharing in a Principal-Agent Experiment

V Anderhub, S Gaechter, M Königstein - 2002 - alexandria.unisg.ch
We study behavior within a simple principal-agent experiment. Our design allows for a large
class of linear contracts. Principals can offer any feasible combination of (negative) fixed …