Complementarity and custom in wage contract violation
JS Earle, K Sabirianova Peter - The Review of Economics and …, 2009 - direct.mit.edu
We present and estimate a model with strategic complementarities in firms' choices of on-
time or delayed wage payment. Linked employer-employee panel data from Russia facilitate …
time or delayed wage payment. Linked employer-employee panel data from Russia facilitate …
Complementarity and Custom in Wage Contract Violation
JS Earle, K Sabirianova Peter - 2008 - papers.ssrn.com
We analyze a model of wage delay in which strategic complementarity arises because each
employer's costs of violating its contracts decrease with the arrears in its labor market. The …
employer's costs of violating its contracts decrease with the arrears in its labor market. The …
[PDF][PDF] Complementarity and Custom in Wage Contract Violation
JS Earle, KS Peter - 2006 - scholar.archive.org
We analyze a model of wage delay in which strategic complementarity arises because each
employer's costs of violating its contracts decrease with the arrears in its labor market. The …
employer's costs of violating its contracts decrease with the arrears in its labor market. The …
Complementarity and Custom in Wage Contract Violation
J Earle, K Sabirianova Peter - The Review of Economics and …, 2009 - econpapers.repec.org
We present and estimate a model with strategic complementarities in firms' choices of on-
time or delayed wage payment. Linked employer-employee panel data from Russia facilitate …
time or delayed wage payment. Linked employer-employee panel data from Russia facilitate …
[PDF][PDF] Complementarity and Custom in Wage Contract Violation
JS Earle, KS Peter - 2006 - Citeseer
We analyze a model of wage delay in which strategic complementarity arises because each
employer's costs of violating its contracts decrease with the arrears in its labor market. The …
employer's costs of violating its contracts decrease with the arrears in its labor market. The …
Complementarity and Custom in Wage Contract Violation
JS Earle, K Sabirianova Peter - 2006 - research.upjohn.org
We analyze a model of wage delay in which strategic complementarity arises because each
employer's costs of violating its contracts decrease with the arrears in its labor market. The …
employer's costs of violating its contracts decrease with the arrears in its labor market. The …
Complementarity and custom in wage contract violation
JS Earle, K Sabirianova Peter - 2006 - econstor.eu
We analyze a model of wage delay in which strategic complementarity arises because each
employer's costs of violating its contracts decrease with the arrears in its labor market. The …
employer's costs of violating its contracts decrease with the arrears in its labor market. The …
Complementarity and Custom in Wage Contract Violation
JS Earle, KS Peter - The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2009 - ideas.repec.org
We present and estimate a model with strategic complementarities in firms' choices of on-
time or delayed wage payment. Linked employer-employee panel data from Russia facilitate …
time or delayed wage payment. Linked employer-employee panel data from Russia facilitate …
COMPLEMENTARITY AND CUSTOM IN WAGE CONTRACT VIOLATION
JS Earle, KS Peter - The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2009 - JSTOR
We present and estimate a model with strategic complementarities in firms' choices of on-
time or delayed wage payment. Linked employer-employee panel data from Russia facilitate …
time or delayed wage payment. Linked employer-employee panel data from Russia facilitate …
[PDF][PDF] Complementarity and Custom in Wage Contract Violation
JS Earle, KS Peter - 2006 - core.ac.uk
We analyze a model of wage delay in which strategic complementarity arises because each
employer's costs of violating its contracts decrease with the arrears in its labor market. The …
employer's costs of violating its contracts decrease with the arrears in its labor market. The …