Incomplete information strengthens the effectiveness of social approval

M Greiff, F Paetzel - Economic Inquiry, 2015 - Wiley Online Library
We present a theoretical model of a public good game in which the expression of social
approval induces pro‐social behavior. Using a laboratory experiment with earned …
被引用次数：13 相关文章

Incomplete information strengthens the effectiveness of social approval

M Greiff, F Paetzel - Economic Inquiry, 2015 - go.gale.com
We present a theoretical model of a public good game in which the expression of social
approval induces pro-social behavior. Using a laboratory experiment with earned …

Incomplete Information Strengthens The Effectiveness Of Social Approval

M Greiff, F Paetzel - Economic Inquiry, 2015 - ideas.repec.org
We present a theoretical model of a public good game in which the expression of social
approval induces pro‐social behavior. Using a laboratory experiment with earned …

INCOMPLETE INFORMATION STRENGTHENS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL APPROVAL.

M Greiff, F Paetzel - Economic Inquiry, 2015 - search.ebscohost.com
We present a theoretical model of a public good game in which the expression of social
approval induces pro-social behavior. Using a laboratory experiment with earned …

INCOMPLETE INFORMATION STRENGTHENS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL APPROVAL

M Greiff, F Paetzel - Economic Inquiry, 2014 - infona.pl
We present a theoretical model of a public good game in which the expression of social
approval induces pro‐social behavior. Using a laboratory experiment with earned …

INCOMPLETE INFORMATION STRENGTHENS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL APPROVAL

M Greiff, F Paetzel - Economic Inquiry, 2015 - econpapers.repec.org
We present a theoretical model of a public good game in which the expression of social
approval induces pro‐social behavior. Using a laboratory experiment with earned …

[引用][C] Incomplete Information Strengthens the Effectiveness of Social Approval

M Greiff, F Paetzel - Economic Inquiry, 2015