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We examine a sequential mechanism which is a simple modification of the normal form
mechanism introduced by Abreu and Matsushima (1992). We show that almost any social …

There are many economic problems which, modelled by games of incomplete information
using sequential equilibrium as the solution concept, give rise to many (often infinitely many) …

The equilibrium concepts that we now think of as various forms of backwards induction,
namely, subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1965), perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975) …

Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality Page 1 GAMES AND
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 8, 6--19 (1995) Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of …

We show that if the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of a stage game is
convexified by the introduction of public random variables, then forward induction loses all …

We present a decentralization result which is useful for practical and theoretical work with
sequential equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and related equilibrium concepts for …

We propose a refinement of sequential equilibrium for extensive form games by generalizing
a restriction proposed for signaling games in Cho and Kreps (1987).^ 2 The restriction is that …

The aim of this paper is to present the new theory called “inductive game theory”. A paper,
published by one of the present authors with A. Matsui, discussed some part of inductive …

In finite games subgame perfect equilibria are precisely those that are obtained by a
backwards induction procedure. In large extensive form games with perfect information this …