We give an example that shows that the set of perfect and hence sequential equilibrium
points is a strict subset of the set of equilibrium points of the Agent normal form. We then …

An extensive form-based proof of the existence of sequential equilibrium | SpringerLink Skip to
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Sequential equilibrium is one of the fundamental and most widely used solution concepts in
dynamic games, yet finding the set of all sequential equilibria in a given game can be …

Although the definition of sequential equilibrium can be applied without change to games of
imperfect recall, doing so leads to arguably inappropriate results. We redefine sequential …

We propose a new criterion for equilibria of extensive games, in the spirit of Selten's
perfectness criteria. This criterion requires that players' strategies be sequentially rational …

We propose a refinement of sequential equilibrium for extensive form games by generalizing
a restriction proposed for signaling games in Cho and Kreps (1987).^ 2 The restriction is that …

We present a decentralization result which is useful for practical and theoretical work with
sequential equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and related equilibrium concepts for …

The equilibrium concepts that we now think of as various forms of backwards induction,
namely, subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1965), perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975) …

I introduce axiomatically infinite sequential games that extend von Neumann and Kuhn's
classic axiomatic frameworks. Within this setup, I define a modified backward induction …

On the backward induction method - ScienceDirect Skip to main contentSkip to article Elsevier
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