Perfect sequential equilibrium
SJ Grossman, M Perry - Journal of economic theory, 1986 - Elsevier
Our equilibrium concept is a restriction of sequential equilibrium. A player chooses a
“metastrategy” which specifies his act as a function of his belief. This permits players to …
“metastrategy” which specifies his act as a function of his belief. This permits players to …
[引用][C] An Equivalent Definition of Sequential Equilibrium and Its Computational Applications
Y Cao, C Dang
On the equivalence between (quasi-) perfect and sequential equilibria
C Pimienta, J Shen - International Journal of Game Theory, 2014 - Springer
On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria | SpringerLink Skip to
main content Advertisement SpringerLink Log in Menu Find a journal Publish with us Search …
main content Advertisement SpringerLink Log in Menu Find a journal Publish with us Search …
[PDF][PDF] Sequential equilibria of multi-stage games with infinite sets of types and actions
RB Myerson, PJ Reny - manuscript, University of Chicago, 2015 - Citeseer
We consider how to extend Kreps and Wilson's 1982 definition of sequential equilibrium to
multi-stage games with infinite sets of types and actions. A concept of open sequential …
multi-stage games with infinite sets of types and actions. A concept of open sequential …
[图书][B] Forward induction and equilibrium refinement
M Okuno-Fujiwara, A Postlewaite - 1987 - cirje.eu-tokyo.ac.jp
There are many economic problems which, modelled by games of incomplete information
using sequential equilibrium as the solution concept, give rise to many (often infinitely many) …
using sequential equilibrium as the solution concept, give rise to many (often infinitely many) …
[PDF][PDF] Short sight in extensive games.
D Grossi, P Turrini - AAMAS, 2012 - Citeseer
The paper introduces a class of games in extensive form where players take strategic
decisions while not having access to the terminal histories of the game, hence being unable …
decisions while not having access to the terminal histories of the game, hence being unable …
Justifiable beliefs in sequential equilibrium
A McLennan - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1985 - JSTOR
An action in an extensive game that has a suboptimal payoff in every sequential equilibrium
is said to be useless. There are sequential equilibria in which beliefs at each information set …
is said to be useless. There are sequential equilibria in which beliefs at each information set …