This paper develops a model of strategic behaviour in continuous time games of complete
information. This model bridges the gap between the differential formulation of a continuous …

Forward induction is the notion that players in a game assume, even when confronted with
an unexpected event, that their opponents chose rationally. It is often motivated by …

The existence of perfect equilibrium is demonstrated for a class of games with compact
space of histories and continuous payoffs, and in which the set of actions feasible at any …

Two of the most important refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept for extensive form
games with perfect recall are Selten's (1975) perfect equilibrium and Kreps and Wilson's …

I introduce a model of extensive form games with coalitional actions, which provides a formal
framework for analyzing situations in which coalitions of players may take joint actions …

This corrigendum corrects a mistake in Theorem 8.1.(a) of the authors' paper Kaneko and
Kline (2008a). Although we need an additional condition for the correction of the claim, it …

In this paper we isolate a particular refinement of the notion of Nash equilibrium that is
characterized by two properties:(i) it provides a unified framework for both backwards and …

In game theory, the concept of Nash equilibrium reflects the collective stability of some
individual strategies chosen by selfish agents. The concept pertains to different classes of …

A player's pure strategy is called relevant for an outcome of a game in extensive form with
perfect recall if there exists a weakly sequential equilibrium with that outcome for which the …