We study existence of equilibria in large games where players use boundedly rational
procedures. The equilibria are different from Nash equilibria; the difference persists even …

We study interactive situations in which players are boundedly rational. Each player, rather
than optimizing given a belief about the other players' behavior, as in the theory of Nash …

We develop a notion of subgames and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium–
possibly in mixed strategies–for stochastic timing games. To capture all situations that can …

Stopping games (without simultaneous stopping) are sequential games in which at every
stage one of the players is chosen according to a stochastic process, and that player …

A player's pure strategy is called relevant for an outcome of a game in extensive form with
perfect recall if there exists a weakly sequential equilibrium with that outcome for which the …

We analyze forward-induction reasoning in games with asymmetric information assuming
some commonly understood restrictions on beliefs. Specifically, we assume that some given …

A refinement of the set of Nash equilibria that satisfies two assumptions is shown to select a
subset that is stable in the sense defined by Kohlberg and Mertens. One assumption …

Abstract In Friedman and Samuelson (1990, Games Econ. Behav. 2, 304–324) we showed
that there exist subgame perfect equilibria for infinitely repeated games in which the …

It is shown that no solution concept that selects sequentially rational (perfect, proper,
persistent, or members of some stable set of) equilibria satisfies the following consistency …

The 'folk theorem'formalizes the theme that 'repetition leads to cooperation'. We present an
example showing that, even with perfect monitoring, the set of Nash equilibria of the …