We propose a new criterion for equilibria of extensive games, in the spirit of Selten's
perfectness criteria. This criterion requires that players' strategies be sequentially rational …

The existence of perfect equilibrium is demonstrated for a class of games with compact
space of histories and continuous payoffs, and in which the set of actions feasible at any …

Our equilibrium concept is a restriction of sequential equilibrium. A player chooses a
“metastrategy” which specifies his act as a function of his belief. This permits players to …

We propose a refinement of sequential equilibrium for extensive form games by generalizing
a restriction proposed for signaling games in Cho and Kreps (1987).^ 2 The restriction is that …

An action in an extensive game that has a suboptimal payoff in every sequential equilibrium
is said to be useless. There are sequential equilibria in which beliefs at each information set …

Two of the most important refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept for extensive form
games with perfect recall are Selten's (1975) perfect equilibrium and Kreps and Wilson's …

We present a decentralization result which is useful for practical and theoretical work with
sequential equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and related equilibrium concepts for …

Publisher Summary This chapterdiscusses formal definitions as well as a few illustrative
examples, for the following notions: games in extensive form, games in strategic form, pure …

A measure of complexity for repeated games strategies is studied. This measure facilitates
the investigation of some issues regarding finite rationality and the structure of subgame …

We present three distinct approaches to perfect and proper equilibria for infinite normal form
games. In the first two approaches, players" tremble" in the infinite games playing full …