A process-oriented framework for goals and motivations in biological and artificial agents

R Manzotti - Causality and motivation, 2010 - degruyter.com
Causality and motivation, 2010degruyter.com
Usually, a motivation is defined as the reason for engaging in a particular behavior,
especially human behavior as studied in psychology and neuropsychology. These reasons
may include basic needs such as food, a desired object, goal, state of being, or ideal. It is a
concept rooted on psychological models. It is not an easy task in purely physical terminology
to translate what a reason is. The case is more or less the following. Consider a machine.
Although it could be useful to attribute a goal to explain what the machine does, it is …
Usually, a motivation is defined as the reason for engaging in a particular behavior, especially human behavior as studied in psychology and neuropsychology. These reasons may include basic needs such as food, a desired object, goal, state of being, or ideal. It is a concept rooted on psychological models. It is not an easy task in purely physical terminology to translate what a reason is. The case is more or less the following. Consider a machine. Although it could be useful to attribute a goal to explain what the machine does, it is generally neither appropriate nor necessary. For instance, the behavior of my washing machine is totally explainable and describable in physical and simple causal terms. No need to attribute any purpose to its outputs. Consider a complex biological being, like a cat. Now, the temptation to introduce a different kind of explanation is much stronger. On one side, it is uncertain whether we will ever be able to explain the cat’s behavior in purely causal terms. On the other side, the cat appears to be driven by something different from pure physical causes—namely intentions, reasons, motivations, or whatever term it could be used to refer to the cat’s ends. This situation lead Daniel Dennett to suppose the existence of an epistemological chasm between the physical and the intentional description of reality (Dennett 1987). Since motivations are goal-oriented, they seem to run afoul a pure causal view of reality. The layman holds that a cause moves from past events to future ones, while a motivation is allegedly “pulled” by a future goal. It is a questionable view that hinders the understanding of motivations. Scholars, who do not maintain that goals somehow lie in the future, often state there is some kind of teleological relation between the motivation and the goal. This relation is reminiscent of Brentano’s intentional relation since it links a mental state to an in-existent object. It is a view that assumes the existence of some kind of mental capability which has no straightforward translation into the physical domain.
De Gruyter
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