[PDF][PDF] Convergence and quality of iterative voting under non-scoring rules
A Koolyk, O Lev, JS Rosenschein - Proceedings of the 2016 …, 2016 - ifaamas.org
A Koolyk, O Lev, JS Rosenschein
Proceedings of the 2016 international conference on autonomous agents …, 2016•ifaamas.orgIterative voting is a social choice mechanism whereby voters are allowed to continually
make strategic changes to their stated preferences until no further change is desired. We
study the iterative voting framework for several common voting rules and show that, for these
rules, an equilibrium may never be reached. We also consider several variations of iterative
voting and show that with these variations equilibrium likewise may not be reached. Finally,
we present an empirical analysis of the quality of candidates elected through iterative voting.
make strategic changes to their stated preferences until no further change is desired. We
study the iterative voting framework for several common voting rules and show that, for these
rules, an equilibrium may never be reached. We also consider several variations of iterative
voting and show that with these variations equilibrium likewise may not be reached. Finally,
we present an empirical analysis of the quality of candidates elected through iterative voting.
Abstract
Iterative voting is a social choice mechanism whereby voters are allowed to continually make strategic changes to their stated preferences until no further change is desired. We study the iterative voting framework for several common voting rules and show that, for these rules, an equilibrium may never be reached. We also consider several variations of iterative voting and show that with these variations equilibrium likewise may not be reached. Finally, we present an empirical analysis of the quality of candidates elected through iterative voting.
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