What are the economic consequences of electing illiberal leaders to power? In this chapter, I argue that in the economic arena increased state power – rather than market forces – is a staple for illiberal leadership. Both in the domestic and international arena I argue that illiberal leaders will enact policies in line with statism and economic nationalism. I examine the varieties of illiberal statism in Eastern Europe (in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic) with examples from banking and foreign investment. The economic concentration taking place in these sectors and its use to further the regime’s ability to stay in power is emblematic of similar processes across other sectors in the three case studies and beyond. In addition to this domestic agenda, illiberal leaders have learned to selectively pick those parts of globalization that are most likely to sustain their regime; by, for example, criticizing multilateral organizations such as the European Union while reaping the benefits of EU membership. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the political use of these ostensibly less than sound economic consolidation policies, from banking and investment to new welfare entitlements, and the sustainability of the illiberal economic project in Eastern Europe.