… Honest audits require sufficient monetary incentives for the auditor, and more frequent audits
call for larger incentives. We link the optimal audit frequency to the budget constraint faced …

… the optimal design of audits when collusion between auditors and audited subjects is a …
in low salaries for public auditors.We show that the optimal audit may be purposely inaccurate, …

… entity that is audited frequently may have institutional knowledge of the quality of audits, as
… case of a pooling equilibrium, in which all agents are honest, as we discuss below. Positive …

… we believe over 90 percent were internal auditors and they are all described here as internal
auditors. … The following paragraphs discuss some of the most frequent comments of callers. …

… that management is dishonest nor assume unquestioned honesty. Professional skepticism
includes a questioning mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence. For example, the …

… auditors’ comfort assessing managers’ honesty (dishonesty). Therefore, we predict that when
auditors assess the honesty of … , auditors choose low-effort audits more frequently when …

… Therefore, we might observe not only less frequent choices of high audit effort, but also a lower
… In our experiment, we analyze the effect some automatically honest auditors (treatment B) …

… of audits and fines on honest reporting … -audit led to a decrease in honest reporting by about
6 pp (p = 0.194). Adding a fine to an audit with a low detection probability, increased honest …

… -)honest taxpayers who experience an audit as well as (dis-)honest taxpayers who do not
experience an audit change … were audited frequently and experienced at least 7 (and up to 19) …

… expected utility of honest policyholders is higher under a commitment to auditing policy than
under … of opportunists lead the company to more frequent audits and, finally, the equilibrium …